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Abstract 
How are relationships between concepts affected by the interplay between short-term contextual 
constraints and long-term conceptual knowledge? Across two studies we investigate the 
consequence of changes in visual context for the dynamics of conceptual processing. Participants’ 
eye movements were tracked as they viewed a visual depiction of e.g. a canary in a birdcage 
(Experiment 1), or a canary and three unrelated objects, each in its own quadrant (Experiment 2). 
In both studies participants heard either a semantically and contextually similar “robin” (a bird; 
similar size), an equally semantically similar but not contextually similar “stork” (a bird; bigger 
than a canary, incompatible with the birdcage), or unrelated “tent”. The changing patterns of 
fixations across time indicated first, that the visual context strongly influenced the eye movements 
such that, in the context of a birdcage, early on (by word offset) hearing “robin” engendered more 
looks to the canary than hearing “stork” or “tent” (which engendered the same number of looks), 
unlike in the context of unrelated objects (in which case “robin” and “stork” engendered 
equivalent looks to the canary, and more than did “tent”). Second, within the 500 ms post-word-
offset eye movements in both experiments converged onto a common pattern (more looks to the 
canary after “robin” than after “stork”, and both more than due to “tent”). We interpret these 
findings as indicative of the dynamics of activation within semantic memory accessed via pictures 
and via words, and reflecting the complex interaction between systems representing context-
independent and context-dependent conceptual knowledge driven by predictive processing.  
 
Keywords: conceptual processing; semantic cognition; eye-movements; dynamics; predictive 
processing 
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Introduction 
 
Our knowledge of the concept of a robin comprises all its diverse properties, including its 
shape and color, the fact that it can fly, and that it is a bird. This intuitive understanding of 
concepts is shared with many cognitive and neural models of semantic memory which 
assume that concept knowledge is represented in terms of features constituting them (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999; Cree & McRae, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Smith, 
Shoben, & Rips, 1974; Taylor, Moss, & Tyler, 2007). Although the specific nature of the 
features varies across these models, they typically represent conceptual knowledge as a static 
featural space, with concepts from the same category (e.g., robin, canary) closer in the space 
than concepts from different categories (e.g., robin, tent), and with these relationships 
relatively fixed.    
However, many studies have demonstrated that the activation of individual conceptual 
properties is highly dynamic. For example, in visual object recognition Yee, Huffstetler, and 
Thompson-Schill (2011) showed that the activation of an object’s conceptual shape (e.g., 
round for a pizza) precedes activation of that object’s conceptual function (e.g., that it is 
edible). In spoken word recognition, Moss, McCormick, and Tyler (1997) showed that the 
functional properties of man-made objects are activated before their perceptual properties 
(e.g., visual form). The difference between the studies showing function before form (e.g., 
Moss et al., 1997) and the studies showing form before function (e.g., Yee et al., 2011) 
highlights the additional issue of the dynamics of processing in semantic memory accessed 
via words and accessed via objects or their visual depictions (cf. Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 
2012; Paivio, 1991). The non-static nature of semantic cognition is further illustrated by 
classic studies in word recognition which have demonstrated that sentential context provides 
a strong constraint on the activation of conceptual properties. For example, recalling the word 
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‘piano’ after hearing The man lifted the piano is more accurate following a contextually 
appropriate cue ‘something heavy’ relative to a plausible, but contextually inappropriate cue, 
e.g., ‘something with a nice sound’ (e.g., Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrel, & Nitsch, 
1974; Tabossi, 1988). Furthermore, Kalénine, Mirman, Middleton, and Buxbaum (2012) 
have demonstrated that sentential context interacts with the time-course of conceptual 
processing: in their study, the differential activation of functional vs. thematic features was 
further modified by context, in that the typically later activation of functional features was 
elicited in an earlier time window with an appropriate sentential context (see also Lee, 
Middleton, Mirman, Kalénine, & Buxbaum, 2013).  
In the current study we explore the consequences of the context and time dependent nature 
of conceptual processing for relationships between concepts. Specifically, we investigate 
first, how the relationship between concepts in semantic memory changes with changes in 
visual context, and second, how this relationship changes across time during which a word 
associated with one of these concepts is heard. For example, does hearing The man lifted the 
piano change the relationship between pianos and violins, and pianos and boulders, and 
moreover do these relationships change over time depending on the dynamics of activation of 
the feature <heavy>? As Tabossi (1988) observed, a critical issue is “when (…) contextual 
information becomes effective” (p. 153), and the notion that, as time unfolds, contextual 
influences may change.  
Our starting point is the observation that on hearing a word, visual attention can be 
directed towards an object that is semantically related to, but is not, the object referred to by 
that word (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Mirman & Magnuson, 
2009; Yee & Sedivy, 2006). Thus, hearing ‘robin’ will engender looks towards a canary, and 
in proportion to the semantic similarity between robins and canaries (Huettig & Altmann, 
2005; Huettig, Quinlan, McDonald, & Altmann, 2006; Mirman & Magnuson, 2009), and 
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similarly on hearing ‘stork’, which also overlaps conceptually with canaries. (In fact, to the 
same degree as ‘robin’ according to semantic similarity norms (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005).)  
However, what would be the consequences of depicting the canary in a visual context 
affording robins but not storks – for example, in a domestic birdcage (Figure 1)? Specifically, 
what is the extent to which visual attention to the canary would reflect the context-
independent conceptual similarity between canaries and robins and canaries and storks versus 
the visual-context dependent constraints that afford robins but not storks?1 Moreover, how 
would the relationship between the concepts change over the time-course of the spoken word 
unfolding within the visual context? How would this relationship change after the word has 
unfolded? 
 
Figure 1. Constrained visual context for the target object: canary (from Experiment 1). 
 
                                                 
1 We use the term “contextual dependence” to refer to dependencies between a particular item and the 
specific, or episodic, context in which it occurs. This usage of the term is different from other uses in 
the literature that relate to the features’ representational status (e.g., Barsalou, 1982). 
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Standard models of semantic memory predict that the shifts in visual attention to objects in 
a scene upon hearing a word would reflect context-independent relationships between 
concepts accessed via visual depictions or via words. For example, looks to the canary would 
be similar when hearing ‘robin’ and when hearing ‘stork’ (assuming they overlap with 
canaries to a similar extent, although even if they overlap to differing extents, the logic we 
describe below remains the same), and both patterns of looks would be dissimilar to the one 
when hearing an unrelated word, e.g. ‘tent’ (e.g., Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Huettig et al., 
2006; Mirman & Magnuson, 2009; Yee & Sedivy, 2006). However, if shifts in visual 
attention also reflect context-dependent relationships between concepts in semantic memory, 
an alternative prediction would be that in the context of Figure 1 there would be more looks 
to the canary when hearing ‘robin’ than when hearing ‘stork’. Moreover, while there would 
also be more looks to the canary after hearing ‘robin’ than after hearing ‘tent’, whether or not 
there would be more looks to the canary after hearing ‘stork’ than after hearing ‘tent’ (storks 
would not fit in the depicted birdcage) would depend on the strength of the contextual 
constraint afforded by the visual context (the canary in a cage). In other words, the presence 
of the cage in the visual context would change the nature of the relationship between 
canaries, robins, and storks: Unlike the static models of semantic memory where these three 
concepts share the same area of the semantic space as defined by e.g. the proportion of shared 
features, the visual context would shift their relative positions in this space making robins 
more similar to canaries and both dissimilar to storks.  
An additional issue is how the activation of properties over time would influence the 
relationships between these concepts. Rogers and Patterson (2007) have suggested that, in a 
distributed model of semantic memory, activation changes over time such that the more 
information is shared among concepts (for example, [context-independent] category/domain-
level information) the earlier it is available in processing, and that over time increasingly 
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more specific information becomes available (see also Clarke & Tyler, 2015). This type of 
conceptual dynamics would predict a late-emerging effect of the visual context, because the 
context influences the fit between the scene and the word regarding specific information (e.g., 
the size of robins and storks). Thus, only early in processing would looks to the canary be 
similar when hearing ‘robin’ and when hearing ‘stork’ (and both dissimilar to when hearing 
‘tent’). The context-dependent similarity between canaries and robins, relative to canaries and 
storks, given that the birdcage affords robins but not storks, would emerge later. This pattern 
of looks would indicate that early conceptual processing is sensitive to context-independent 
relationships between concepts, and that context-dependent relationships emerge later in time 
as the activation spreads through the semantic network2.  
A different prediction arises from evidence for early effects of context in studies of visual 
object recognition (see Bar, 2004;  and Oliva & Torralba, 2007, for reviews). For example, in 
a sentence-picture verification study using sentential contexts describing different states of an 
object (e.g., flying duck vs. sitting duck, ‘The ranger saw a duck in the air, ‘The ranger saw 
a duck in the lake), participants were not only faster to recognize the object when its depicted 
state (e.g., flying duck) matched the one described in the sentential context (duck in the air), 
but crucially this effect was reflected in the early modulation of the M1 component of neural 
activity in the occipital cortex, with a stronger response to the state-matching picture relative 
to both the state-mismatching and an unrelated picture within the first 100 ms from picture 
onset (Hirschfeld, Zwitserlood, & Dobel, 2011). Thus, in the context of a visual scene 
affording robins but not storks, access to context-relevant specific information, including the 
relationship between the cage and the canary and the constraints this places on the canary 
                                                 
2As pointed out below, the standard featural models of semantic memory (e.g., Cree & McRae, 2003; 
Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007) are not in principle incompatible with time and 
context-sensitivity. 
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(e.g., size), should be available early. Hence early in the processing of ‘robin’ or ‘stork’, 
looks to the canary depicted in the context of a birdcage would reflect higher context-
dependent similarity between canaries and robins than between canaries and storks. These 
predictions also fit a broader set of models of predictive processing which describe the brain 
as a ‘proactive’ organ continuously anticipating upcoming input (e.g., Bar, 2007; Clark, 
2013). In this view, context preactivates likely object representations and in this way enacts 
top-down constraints (Trapp & Bar, 2015). The predictive processing driven by the context 
would result in a change in the semantic space such that the greater context-dependent 
similarity between canaries and robins relative to storks would be evident early in processing. 
What remains unclear in this account is whether and at what point in time there would be 
evidence of the context-independent similarity between the three (i.e. as defined by all three 
being members of the bird category).  
Below, we explore these alternative views of processing dynamics in semantic memory by 
examining the probability through time of fixating a visual depiction of a canary in a cage 
(Experiment 1), and of fixating the same canary among unrelated objects (Experiment 2), in 
three different conditions: First, when the picture is accompanied by a semantically and 
contextually similar word (‘robin’); second, when it is accompanied by a semantically but not 
contextually similar word (‘stork’), and third, by both semantically and contextually unrelated 
word (‘tent’). (We use the term ‘contextually similar’ relative to the constraining contexts of 
Experiment 1 – in Experiment 2 there are no contextual constraints beyond the unrelated 
objects presented concurrently in the display. ) We assume the standard linking hypothesis 
concerning the relationship between conceptual representation, language, and visual attention 
(Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Tanenhaus, 
Magnuson, Dahan, & Chambers, 2000), and interpret the probability of fixation at each time 
point as an indication of the activation level of those components of the conceptual 
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representations activated by the target word (e.g., ‘stork’) that overlap with those associated 
with the target object (the canary). At issue is whether the effects of context are early or late, 
how these effects change across time, and crucially how they impact on the conceptual 
similarity of the target object (the canary) to objects that are related (robins and storks are 




In this experiment, individual target objects (e.g., a canary) were presented in the context of a 
visual scene (e.g., the canary was depicted in a birdcage; Figure 1). For standard models of 
semantic memory, the relationship between canaries and robins and storks is determined by 
their semantic similarity defined by their shared features, with features being fixed 
dimensions of the semantic space. For measures of semantic similarity derived from these 
models (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; McRae et al., 2005), canaries are as similar to robins as 
they are to storks (see Table 1 below). However, in the context of a visual scene affording 
robins but not storks (due to their size and likelihood of fitting into a cage) the conceptual 
representation of a canary may be more similar to a robin than to a stork. In fact, in this 
particular context, storks may be no more similar to canaries than to completely unrelated 
concepts (e.g., tent). If this is the case, participants’ eye movements to the canary (in Figure 
1) should reflect this context-dependent semantic similarity: There should be more looks to 
the canary in response to the word ‘robin’ than in response to either ‘stork’ or ‘tent’. At issue 
here is first, the extent to which visual context changes the relationship between the concepts, 
and second, when such change is observed in the eye movement record. 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty-two native speakers of English from the University of York participated in the study 
for monetary remuneration (£4) or course credit after providing a written informed consent. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of 21 quadruplets: a visual target (a canary), a semantically and 
contextually related word (‘robin’), a semantically but not contextually related word (‘stork’), 
and a semantically and contextually unrelated word (‘tent’) (see Appendices A and B for the 
full set of items). Semantically related words (‘robin’, ‘stork’) were from the same semantic 
category as the target object, and were equally semantically similar to the target, as measured 
by the semantic similarity norms of McRae and colleagues (McRae et al., 2005), as well as 
by LSA norms (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) (for the McRae norms: t(40) = -.067, p = .95; for 
LSA: t(40) = -.55, p = .59; Table 1). Unrelated words were semantically unrelated to the 
target object. The words in the three conditions were equated in length (number of phonemes 
and spoken duration) and word frequency (Table 1). The words were digitally recorded by a 
native English speaker in a sound attenuated booth, sampled at 44.1 KHz.  
The visual stimuli consisted of 21 images representing the target object (e.g., canary) in 
the context of two unrelated objects (e.g., table, pot plant) and one object that contained or 
otherwise constrained the target object (e.g. a birdcage, with the canary inside the cage; see 
Appendix B for the full set of experimental images). The two unrelated objects were 
unrelated to the three spoken words. The visual scenes were designed such that they afforded 
the semantically and contextually similar item, but not the semantically equally similar but 
contextually-dissimilar item. For example, due to size restrictions, only a robin can fit the 
cage in Figure 1, but not a stork. 
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Table 1. Properties of the spoken words in the three conditions. 
  Semantically and 
contextually related 
Semantically but not 




McRae norms 0.347 0.349 0 
LSA 0.282 0.313 0.066 
Length 
number of 
phonemes 5.1 5.1 4.9 
spoken duration 
(ms) 
531 539 529 
Log frequency  
(British National Corpus) 
6.2 6.4 6.8 
 
 
The visual scenes were created using commercially available ClipArt. They were 
displayed as 800 x 600 px images on a computer screen with a resolution of 1024 x 768 px. 
All target objects were clearly visible in all images. 
In addition to 21 experimental visual scenes, there were 43 filler scenes, similar in 
complexity and content to the experimental items. The spoken word for 32 of the filler items 
referred to an object presented in the scene. In 11 filler items the spoken word was unrelated 
to any of the objects presented in the scene. Thus within each list of items 50% were visual 
scenes where the spoken word referred to an entity in the scene, 28% were scenes where the 
word was unrelated to any entity in the scene, and 22% were scenes where the word was 
related to an entity in the scene. 
There were three lists of 64 items, such that participants saw each visual scene only once. 
Within each list, a third of the experimental items was presented with a semantically and 
contextually related word, a third was presented with a semantically but not contextually 
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related word, and a third was presented with an unrelated word. Thus the semantic and 
contextual relationship between target objects and auditory words was manipulated both 
within participants and within items. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a 22-inch display monitor, with their eyes approximately 
60 cm away from the monitor. They wore an EyeLink II head-mounted eye-tracker, sampling 
at 250 Hz. The auditory stimuli were presented via two loudspeakers located at each side of 
the display monitor. 
Participants were instructed to look at the visual scene and listen to the words played over 
the loudspeakers and try to understand them (the ‘look-and-listen’ task, Altmann and Kamide 
(1999)).  
A drift-correction dot was presented at the onset of each trial. After the participant looked 
at the dot, it was replaced by the visual stimulus. After 3s, the auditory stimulus was played 
over the loudspeakers. The visual stimulus stayed on the screen for an additional 2s post-
word offset. A 9-point calibration procedure was performed after every 8 trials.  There were 4 




We used mixed effects modeling with empirical logit transformed proportion of fixations to 
the target object (canary) aggregated over 50 ms bins as the outcome measure, separately by 
participants and by items (Barr, 2008;  [dataset] Mirković & Altmann, 2018)3. The analyses 
were run using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Machler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). To 
                                                 
3 The analyses using raw proportions (suggested by a reviewer based on Donnelly & 
Verkuilen, 2017) yielded the same pattern of findings for both Experiments. 
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minimize the influence of the variation in the duration of the spoken words, we present the 
analyses in two 500 ms windows, with the first window synchronized to the word onset, and 
the second to the word offset, on a trial by trial basis (the average duration of the auditory 
stimuli was 532 ms). Time and Word (semantically and contextually similar (e.g., robin), 
semantically but not contextually similar (e.g., stork), and semantically and contextually 
unrelated (e.g., tent)) were included as fixed factors. Random effects for participants and 
items were included with maximal inclusion of random slopes that allowed the model to 
converge (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). In Experiment 1, to model Word effects 
Helmert coding was used to first compare looks to the canary when hearing the semantically 
and contextually related word (e.g., robin) relative to the semantically but not contextually 
related (stork) and unrelated (tent) words, and second to compare the latter two (stork and 
tent). Significance was calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation.  
 
Results  
The time course of fixations to the target objects is presented in Figure 2, and model 
parameters in Table 2. As the spoken word unfolded in time (the first 500 ms time window 
from word onset), there was an overall increase in looks to the target object (e.g., canary) (the 
effect of time in Table 2). Crucially, the rate of the increase was significantly higher while 
hearing ‘robin’ than while hearing ‘stork’ or ‘tent’ (time x robin vs. stork+tent), with no 
difference between ‘stork’ and ‘tent’ (time x stork vs. tent) over this time period. Thus the 
visual context had an early effect on the relationship between the concepts, with the looks to 
the canary reflecting a higher overlap with the semantically and contextually related ‘robin’ 
relative to the semantically but not contextually related ‘stork’. Crucially, for most of the 
duration of the spoken word the looks to the target did not reflect the category/domain-level 
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similarity, as they were no different while hearing the semantically but not contextually 
related ‘stork’ relative to the completely unrelated ‘tent’ (Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1: The time-course of fixations to the target object (e.g., canary) in the 
context of a visual scene. The left half of the figure represents fixations synchronized to the onset of 
the auditory stimulus (semantically and contextually related: ‘robin’, semantically but not 
contextually related: ‘stork’, unrelated: ‘tent’), and the right half to the offset of the auditory stimulus, 
on a trial-by-trial basis. Proportions of fixations are presented in all figures for ease of interpretation. 
Error bars represent standard error. 
 
A difference between ‘stork’ and ‘tent’ started to emerge only at the end of the spoken 
word. The analyses of the looks in the 500 ms window synchronized to the word offset 
showed that at word offset there continued to be more looks to the canary after hearing 
‘robin’ relative to both ‘stork’ and ‘tent’ (Table 3: robin vs. stork+tent ), and a difference 
emerged  between ‘stork’ and ‘tent’ (stork vs. tent). Over this time period a significant 
difference in the rate of change in the looks to the canary after hearing ‘stork’ relative to 
‘tent’ also emerged (time x stork vs. tent). Thus the looks to the canary immediately after 
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word offset continued to show a higher similarity to the semantically and contextually related 
‘robin’, but now the looks also reflected the category/domain-level higher overlap with 
‘stork’ relative to ‘tent’. 
 
Table 2. Model parameters for empirical logit transformed proportions of looks to the target 
in Experiment 1 synchronized to the word onset. 
 
Fixed factors By participants By items 
 ß SE t p ß SE t p 
time 3.86 .16 23.47 <.001 4.63 .33 13.90 <.001 
robin vs. stork+tent .00 .08 .01 >.1 .06 .09 .70 >.1 
stork vs. tent -.04 .15 -.30 >.1 -.05 .17 -.29 >.1 
time x robin vs. stork+tent .63 .13 4.87 <.001 .49 .17 2.98 .003 
time x stork vs. tent .20 .22 .90 >.1 .15 .29 .52 >.1 
 
Note: Random effects structure: intercept and slopes for time,  robin vs. stork + tent, and stork vs. tent 
(by participants and by items). 
 
Table 3. Model parameters for empirical logit transformed proportions of looks to the 
target in Experiment 1 synchronized to the word offset. 
 
Fixed factors By participants By items 
 ß SE t p ß SE t p 
time -.47 .21 -2.18 .035 -.45 .29 -1.58 >.1 
robin vs. stork+tent .48 .07 6.84 <.001 .50 .12 4.18 <.001 
stork vs. tent .37 .15 2.43 .019 .44 .22 1.98 .047 
time x robin vs. stork+tent .20 .11 1.78 .076 .27 .16 1.75 .080 
time x stork vs. tent 1.35 .20 6.88 <.001 1.21 .27 4.47 <.001 
 
Note: Random effects structure: intercept and slopes for time,  robin vs. stork + tent, and stork vs. tent 
(by participants and by items). 
 
Discussion 
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Given prior semantic similarity effects using the same paradigm (e.g., Huettig & Altmann, 
2005; Huettig et al., 2006; Mirman & Magnuson, 2009; Yee & Sedivy, 2006), these findings 
demonstrate that visual context can exert a strong influence on the relationship between 
concepts, making semantically but not contextually related concepts no more similar to each 
other than are completely unrelated concepts. This runs counter to the views of semantic 
memory which describe concepts in terms of fixed points in semantic space (e.g., Cree & 
McRae, 2003; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; McRae et al., 2005). Some of these models are not 
in principle incompatible with our findings (e.g., Cree & McRae, 2003; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004), but what our findings clearly demonstrate is that they must be extended 
to be able to accommodate the dynamical change of the semantic space resulting from 
contextual constraints. Moreover, the finding that the early looks reflected the effect of the 
visual context fits with the predictions of models of predictive processing (Bar, 2007; Trapp 
& Bar, 2015) in that the visual scene pre-activated the context-relevant features allowing for 
the effect to emerge early as the semantically and contextually related spoken word was 
unfolding. Importantly, the category/domain-level similarity between concepts (both robin 
and stork different from tent) only emerged later, in the looks post-word offset. It is important 
to note that our assumption here is that the dynamics of semantic activation during the 3 s 
delay between display onset and word onset is constant across conditions (e.g., Chen & 
Mirman, 2015), and that any changes in that dynamic as a function of word type, as 
evidenced by the eye movement measure, will reflect the interaction between the prior 
semantic activation driven by the visual image, and the semantic dynamics associated with 
recognition of the unfolding word in the context of the visual scene. We return to the 
implications of these findings in the General Discussion. 
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Experiment 2 
 
To further test the early context-dependent change in the relationship between concepts in 
semantic memory, in Experiment 2 we presented the same target objects in the context of 
three unrelated objects (Figure 3). In this case the available visual context should not afford 
robins any more than storks (or tents), and thus this context should reveal standard 
category/domain-level semantic similarity effects  (e.g., Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Yee & 
Sedivy, 2006), i.e. more looks to the canary after hearing both robin and stork relative to tent. 
Note that the concept of the canary is accessed by its visual depiction, which may influence 
the dynamics of activation of its visual properties (Moss et al., 1997; Yee et al., 2011). 
Similar to Experiment 1, a distributed model of conceptual processing (e.g., Rogers & 
Patterson, 2007) would predict that the early looks to the canary would reflect conceptual 
differences at the context-independent (category/domain) level. Thus we would expect more 
early looks to the canary when hearing both robin and stork relative to tent and no difference 
between robin and stork (to the extent that they are equally similar to the concept canary), 
while later looks may reflect specific, visual form-related differences between the concepts. 
Models of predictive processing (e.g., Bar, 2007) would converge on similar predictions, as 
the objects in the visual context are unrelated and thus no specific context-relevant property 
would be expected to preactivate.  
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Thirty nine native speakers of English from the University of York participated in the study 
for monetary remuneration (£4) or course credit. 
 
Stimuli 
The visual stimuli consisted of 21 images representing the target object (e.g., canary) in the 
context of three unrelated objects (e.g., drums, paintbrush, foliage). Each object was located 
at the center of a 400 x 300 pixel quadrant. The three unrelated objects were also unrelated to 
the three auditory words. As in Experiment 1, the image dimensions were 800 x 600 pixels, 
displayed on the screen with a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. We used the same visual 
depiction of the target object (the same Clipart image) as in Experiment 1 (see Appendix B 
for the images). The same words (and audio files) were used as in Experiment 1.  
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We included 43 filler items, using the same objects as in the fillers from Experiment 1. 
Similar to the experimental items, each filler image contained four objects. Thirty-two filler 
images were presented with a word that named one of the four objects, and 11 filler images 
were presented with a word unrelated to any of the objects. 
The location of the target object was counterbalanced such that it was equally likely to 
occur in all four quadrants. There were three lists of 64 items, employing the same design as 
Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure and Data Analysis 
The procedure and data analyses ([dataset] Mirković & Altmann, 2018) were the same as in 
Experiment 1. The only exception was the Helmert coding scheme: given the predictions, the 
coding scheme compared first, the looks to the canary while hearing ‘robin’ and ‘stork’ 




The time course of fixations to the target objects in the context of three other unrelated 
objects is presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Experiment 2: The time-course of fixations to the target object (canary) presented in the 
context of three unrelated objects. The left half of the figure represents fixations synchronized to the 
onset of the auditory stimulus (‘robin’, ‘stork’, ‘tent’), and the right half to the offset of the auditory 
stimulus, calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
As the word unfolded in time there was an overall increase in the looks to the target object 
(Table 4: time). As illustrated in Figure 4, the rate of the increase in looks to the canary was 
higher while hearing ‘robin’ and ‘stork’ relative to ‘tent’ (time x robin+stork vs. tent): looks 
to the canary plateaued midway through hearing unrelated ‘tent’, while they continued to rise 
while hearing ‘robin’ and ‘stork’. There was a faster rate of increase for ‘robin’ relative to 
‘stork’ (time x robin vs. stork), but unlike Experiment 1, at word offset the looks to the 
canary were exactly the same after having just heard ‘robin’ or ‘stork’ (Table 5: robin vs. 
stork), and in both cases there were more looks for both relative to ‘tent’ (Table 5: 
robin+stork vs. tent). Over this 500 ms period post word offset, looks to the canary after 
hearing ‘robin’ or ‘stork’ continued to rise faster relative to ‘tent’ (Table 5: time x 
robin+stork vs. tent). There was now also a clear faster increase after ‘robin’ relative to 
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‘stork’ (Table 5: time x robin vs. stork): looks to the canary after hearing ‘stork’ plateaued 
midway through this period, while they continued to rise after hearing ‘robin’. 
 
Table 4. Model parameters for empirical logit transformed proportions of looks to the 
target in Experiment 2 synchronized to the word onset. 
Fixed factors By participants By items 
 ß SE t p ß SE t p 
time 2.69 .25 10.55 <.001 3.20 .28 11.48 <.001 
robin+stork vs. tent .02 .09 .26 >.1 .02 .09 .22 >.1 
robin vs. stork -.16 .17 -.95 >.1 -.26 .20 -1.33 >.1 
time x robin+stork vs. tent .59 .13 4.54 <.001 .67 .17 3.83 <.001 
time x robin vs. stork .56 .23 2.48 .013 .98 .30 3.25 .001 
 
Note: Random effects structure: intercept and slopes for time,  robin + stork vs. tent, and robin vs. 




Table 5. Model parameters for empirical logit transformed proportions of looks to the 
target in Experiment 2 synchronized to the word offset. 
Fixed factors By participants By items 
 ß SE t p ß SE t p 
time 1.17 .26 4.58 <.001 1.33 .35 3.76 .001 
robin+stork vs. tent .56 .10 5.84 <.001 .54 .14 3.80 <.001 
robin vs. stork .02 .15 .12 >.1 .04 .24 .19 >.1 
time x robin+stork vs. tent .51 .14 3.67 <.001 .75 .17 4.44 <.001 
time x robin vs. stork 1.08 .24 4.51 <.001 1.08 .29 3.68 <.001 
 
Note: Random effects structure: intercept and slopes for time,  robin + stork vs. tent, and robin vs. 
stork (by participants and by items). 
 
 
These findings show that when an object (e.g., a canary) is presented in the context of 
unrelated objects, the conceptual correlates of the unfolding semantically related words (e.g., 
robin, stork) are initially perceived as similar to the conceptual correlates of the target object. 
As illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, this category/domain-level similarity between the concepts 
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was reflected in the parallel rise of looks to the target object as the category-related words 
unfolded. The dynamics of looks during this period is strikingly different from the looks to 
the same target object while hearing the same spoken words in Experiment 1, when that 
target object was presented in a meaningful visual scene (Figures 2 and 5). In that case, the 
visual scene modulated the activation of the conceptual representations: whereas in the 
context of unrelated objects ‘robin’ and ‘stork’ “travel together” as they unfold reflecting a 
similar degree of conceptual overlap with the canary, the same is not the case in the context 
of a meaningful visual scene. Here, the concept associated with ‘robin’ is more similar to the 
conceptual representation of the canary given the visual context than is the concept associated 
with ‘stork’, and hence the latter “travels together” with the unrelated ‘tent’.  
 
Figure 5. Fixations to the target object (canary) in the context of a scene (Experiment 1: squares) or 
in the context of three unrelated objects presented in different quadrants (Experiment 2: triangles) 
from word onset. Error bars (for the scene context) and ribbons (for the quadrants) represent standard 
error. 
 
To further assess the conceptual dynamics in the two visual contexts, we pooled the data 
from the two experiments together. We compared the looks to the target object at word offset, 
and the time course for 500 ms after word offset. The analyses at word offset are analogous 
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to more traditional analyses of eye movements that, rather than assessing eye movements 
over an entire time-course, assess the looks to the target at a particular moment in time. These 
analyses reflect the outcome of the early interaction between visual and linguistic processing 
in the time leading up to word offset. The analyses of the time-course synchronized to the 
word offset assess the dynamics of the eye movements from the moment when both the 
visual context and the linguistic stimuli were fully available for processing onward.  
The analyses at word offset used the empirical logit-transformed proportions of fixations 
at the target synchronized to the word offset, while the time-course analyses used the 
proportions over 50 ms bins starting from the word offset for 500 ms. In both analyses, the 
fixed factors included visual context (scene vs. quadrants, i.e. Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 
2), and word type using Experiment 2 contrasts. The use of Experiment 2 contrasts, 
comparing looks after hearing ‘robin’ and ‘stork’ relative to ‘tent’, and then ‘robin’ vs. 
‘stork’,  allowed us to assess more specific hypotheses than an ANOVA-style omnibus 
interaction, and in particular the key visual context x ‘robin’ vs. ‘stork’ interaction. This 
interaction assesses the extent to which the visual context changes the relationship between 
semantically related concepts, i.e. the extent to which context-dependent similarity influences 
processing.  
As illustrated in Figure 6, at word offset there were overall more looks to the canary 
immediately upon hearing both ‘robin’ and ‘stork’ relative to ‘tent’, and upon hearing ‘robin’ 
relative to ‘stork’ (Table 6, by-participant analysis). Crucially, there were significantly more 
looks to the canary upon hearing ‘robin’ than upon hearing ‘stork’ in the context of the visual 
scene but not in the context of three unrelated objects (context x robin vs. stork interaction in 
Table 6, by-participant analysis). Given that none of the effects were significant in the by-
item analysis (which is likely under-powered, Brysbaert and Stevens (2018)), these findings 
should be taken with caution. However, overall, these analyses provide evidence that by word 
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offset the visual scene affording robins but not storks makes the conceptual correlates of the 
word ‘robin’ more similar to the concept of the canary than the conceptual correlates of the 




Figure 6. Fixations on the target object (canary) in the context of a scene (Experiment 1) and in the 
context of three unrelated objects presented in different quadrants (Experiment 2) at word offset. 
Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Table 6. Model parameters for empirical logit transformed proportion of looks at word offset 
for the pooled data.  
Fixed factors By participants By items 
 ß SE t p ß SE t p 
context .17 .12 1.42 >.1 .28 .22 1.28 >.1 
robin+stork vs. tent .38 .07 5.30 <.001 .39 .10 3.97 <.1 
robin vs. stork .25 .12 2.04 .044 .32 .18 1.75 .087 
context x robin+stork vs. tent -.23 .14 -1.60 >.1 -.19 .20 -0.94 >.1 
context x robin vs. stork .67 .25 2.67 .008 .57 .37 1.55 >.1 
 
Note: Random effects structure: intercept and slopes for robin vs. stork (by participants and by items). 
 
The time-course of looks to the target object in two visual contexts synchronized to the 
word offset (Figure 7) provides further support to the finding that visual context influences 
the dynamics of conceptual processing.  The key influence of the visual context on the 
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dynamics of eye movements is illustrated in the three-way interaction between visual context, 
time and the robin vs. stork contrast (Table 7): First, while already at the start of this period 
(word offset) in the context of a scene (affording robins but not storks) there are more looks 
to the canary upon hearing ‘robin’ than upon hearing ‘stork’, and in both conditions more 
relative to ‘tent’, in the context of three unrelated objects there is initially the same amount of 
looks to the canary upon hearing ‘robin’ and upon hearing ‘stork’, and in both cases more 
relative to ‘tent’.  Second, while this pattern of looks is maintained in the scene context 
(particularly for ‘robin’ and ‘stork’, with a small decrease upon hearing ‘tent’), in the context 
of unrelated objects the eye movements continue to evolve such that in a period 
approximately 300 ms after word offset there is a rise in the looks to the canary upon hearing 
‘robin’, and not much further change upon hearing ‘stork’ or ‘tent’. These analyses again 
demonstrate that the visual context crucially changes the relationship between concepts as 
reflected in the eye movements to the target object. 
  
 
Figure 7. Fixations to the target object (canary) in the context of a scene (Experiment 1) or in the 
context of three unrelated objects presented in different quadrants (Experiment 2). The eye 
movements were synchronized to the word offset on a trial-by-trial basis. Error bars (for the scene 
context) and ribbons (for the quadrants) represent standard error. 
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Table 7. Model parameters for empirical logit transformed fixation proportions for the pooled 
data over the 500 ms period synchronized to the word offset.  
 
Fixed factors By participants By items 
 ß SE t p ß SE t p 
context .19 .13 1.49 >.1 .16 .24 .69 >.1 
time .35 .17 2.13 .037 .44 .23 1.93 .061 
robin+stork vs. tent .49 .06 7.74 <.001 .51 .10 5.34 <.001 
robin vs. stork .28 .10 2.84 .005 .29 .16 1.79 .079 
context x time -1.63 .33 -4.94 <.001 -1.78 .45 -3.92 <.001 
context x robin+stork vs. tent  -.13 .13 -1.00 >.1 -.07 .19 -.38 >.1 
context x robin vs. stork .52 .20 2.66 .009 .48 .32 1.52 >.1 
time x robin+stork vs. tent .64 .09 7.21 <.001 .75 .12 6.48 <.001 
time x robin vs. stork .35 .15 2.30 .021 .44 .20 2.22 .027 
context x time x robin+stork vs. tent .27 .18 1.50 >.1 -.01 .23 -.05 >.1 
context x time x robin vs. stork -1.45 .31 -4.72 <.001 -1.27 .40 -3.19 .001 
 
Note: Random effects structure: intercept and slopes for time,  robin + stork vs. tent, and robin vs. 




The initial pattern of looks to the target object found in the context of unrelated objects 
(Experiment 2) is in line with the standard models of semantic memory (e.g., Cree & McRae, 
2003; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007), and with 
behavioral findings showing the sensitivity of eye movements to context-independent 
category/domain-level semantic similarity (e.g., Huettig & Altmann, 2005). Thus looks to the 
target object (e.g., canary) increase while hearing semantically related words (robin, stork) 
relative to unrelated words (tent).  Interestingly, the conceptual relationships (reflected in the 
eye movements) even in this seemingly neutral context change across time, in that later eye 
movements reveal higher similarity between robins and canaries than between storks and 
canaries (as evidenced by more fixations on the canary in response to ‘robin’ than to ‘stork’). 
We interpret these findings as reflecting different ways of accessing the conceptual system 
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via pictures and via words (e.g., Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012): the visual depiction of 
the canary provides specific information about the visual-form (e.g., size, shape, color) unlike 
a spoken or a printed word. Thus we hypothesize that the greater similarity in visual 
properties between canaries and robins relative to storks (for example, with regards to size) 
led to the late-emerging difference between robins and storks. The reason for its late 
emergence here is that size was a less relevant featural dimension in the displays used in 
Experiment 2 than it was in the context of the visual scenes used in Experiment 1, where size 
was key in respect of the interpretation of, and integration across, the elements of the scene.4 
Thus, from the perspective of accounts of predictive processing (e.g., Bar, 2007),  there was 
no pre-activation of a specific context-related feature given the neutral context of the 
unrelated objects. This findings is also compatible with the late emerging differences in 
specific names in the model of Rogers and Patterson (2007), implementing standard models 
of semantic cognition. 
 The joint analyses across the two experiments and two visual contexts provide additional 
evidence to demonstrate the crucial influence of context on the dynamics of conceptual 
processing, which we discuss further below. 
                                                 
4 It could be argued that our effects in Experiment 1 may have been exacerbated by size becoming a 
particularly salient feature across trials (albeit implicitly – we observed no differences across word 
conditions during the 3 second preview period).  Similarly, the scenes in Experiment 1 may have led 
inadvertently to expectations regarding the spoken word (e.g., that it will be related somehow to the 
more salient object(s) in the scene) that were absent in Experiment 2. At issue is why certain relations 
would be more expected than others (e.g. making ‘robin’ more expected than ‘stork’) – indeed, this is 
exactly the contrast that we intended to study: Contextual relevance, contextual salience, and 
contextual expectation are closely related; salience and expectation are themselves contextually 
determined. The conceptual activation dynamics we observed in both studies necessarily reflect 
contextual dependencies, as intended. 
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General Discussion 
 
Across two experiments exploring spoken word processing in the context of a visual scene 
we found that the content of the visual scene crucially determines the relationship between 
the concepts represented by the words and the objects in the scene. In Experiment 1, in the 
context of a meaningful visual scene depicting a canary and affording robins but not storks 
(two concepts otherwise equally similar to the canary), participants’ eye movements to the 
canary reflected the greater context-dependent similarity between canaries and robins relative 
to canaries and storks. The context dependence was evident early on in the processing of the 
word, with a clear advantage for ‘robin’ relative to ‘stork’ at word offset. Moreover, the early 
looks indicated that in the context of the visual scene storks were no more similar to canaries 
than were tents – the specifics of the visual context gave greater prominence to featural 
dimensions that were contextually relevant, thereby influencing early conceptual activation 
along those dimensions. Over time, the dynamics of activation in semantic memory allowed 
for context-independent category/domain-level similarities between canaries and storks (e.g., 
that they are both birds) to emerge. Crucially, the dynamics we observed reflected the 
relationship between the unfolding conceptual correlates of the auditory word and the 
(potentially still unfolding) conceptual correlates of the target object and of the context in 
which it occurred; that is, the observed dynamics do not just reflect the changing relationship 
between the auditory word and the target object, but between the auditory word and the 
distinct (but dynamically interacting) elements of the scene more generally. In contrast, in the 
absence of a meaningful visual scene, i.e. in the context of three objects unrelated to birds or 
tents in Experiment 2, featural dimensions on which storks and canaries differ were not 
contextually relevant, and early looks to the canary reflected the context-independent 
category/domain-level similarity between canaries and robins, and canaries and storks, 
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relative to tents. Over time, the dynamics of activation in semantic memory accessed by the 
words and by a specific visual instantiation of the depicted concept allowed for the 
differences between storks and canaries, and robins and canaries, to emerge. Thus 
participants’ eye movements to objects in a display were modulated by the spoken words in a 
way that revealed an interaction between the visual context in which the object was situated 
and both context-dependent and context-independent conceptual properties of heard words 
and the depicted object. Critically, this interaction was reflected in the differences in the time 
course with which the activation in semantic memory manifested behaviorally, specifically 
showing the impact of the shifting semantic space on selective (visual) attention. 
We appealed to the predictive processing framework in visual cognition (e.g., Bar, 2007) 
to account for the early effect of the visual context in Experiment 1, where the context of the 
visual scene pre-activates context-relevant features which then facilitate the activation of the 
semantically and contextually related conceptual correlates of the unfolding word ‘robin’ 
relative to the semantically but not contextually related correlates of the word ‘stork’ (and 
relative to completely unrelated word ‘tent’). According to this framework, the neural 
processes supporting cognition allow for continuous anticipation of future outcomes based on 
current input. Specifically, Bar (2007) suggests that the current input is mapped onto memory 
representations by a process of similarity-based analogy, and the associative nature of 
memory allows for the activation to spread through memory networks, constituting the 
process of forecasting predictions (see Altmann & Mirković, 2009; and Kuperberg & Jaeger, 
2016, for related proposals in language comprehension). Crucially, the context in which the 
input is encountered constrains the activation in memory such that it biases the activation of 
context-relevant features. This process is accomplished by reciprocal connections between 
neural networks that encompass what are traditionally considered semantic and episodic 
memory areas, and pre-frontal regions involved in prediction processes (see Clarke, Taylor, 
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& Tyler, 2011; Clarke & Tyler, 2015; Dikker & Pylkkanen, 2013, for related evidence). This 
view is also compatible with recent versions of distributed models of semantic cognition that 
include a separate semantic control network that allows for greater time and context 
sensitivity (e.g., Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017). 
Context effects and prediction are not in principle incompatible with standard cognitive 
models of semantic memory (e.g., Cree & McRae, 2003; Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Taylor 
et al., 2007). They can be captured as dynamic changes in the featural semantic space as a 
function of context. In distributed featural models, the consequence of these changes is a 
warping of the semantic space, crucially changing the relationships between concepts, and 
making semantically and contextually related concepts more similar to each other than 
semantically but not contextually related concepts (see Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 
2013 for neural evidence of the warping of semantic networks as a result of task contexts). 
Alternatively, the same effects may be captured by modeling the fit between the context and 
the currently processed concepts. Importantly, and as shown in our studies, the context-
related change in the semantic space does not obliterate the long-term conceptual knowledge: 
in Experiment 1, the context-independent category/domain level similarity emerges in later 
processing, and in the neutral context of Experiment 2 it emerges early in processing, as 
predicted by standard models of semantic memory (e.g., Rogers & Patterson, 2007).  
Regardless of the visual context, and notably even when relative size is irrelevant 
(Experiment 2), the patterns of eye movements eventually settle to reveal more subtle 
differences in conceptual overlap than are revealed through either semantic feature norms 
(McRae et al., 2005) or LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) – namely, that robins are more 
similar to canaries than are storks, precisely because of their size. The late-emerging 
difference between robins and storks as they relate to canaries in the neutral context of 
Experiment 2 provides further evidence in support of the idea that there are differences in 
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conceptual representations that are activated by words and by the concept’s visual depictions 
(e.g., Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012). In particular, the visual depiction of the concept of 
a canary is far richer in perceptual detail than the categorical abstraction of the spoken word  
(see also Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015, 2017). The specific visual properties instantiated in the 
picture clearly activate different aspects of the conceptual representation than an isolated 
word, and have further consequences for the dynamics of activation in semantic memory and 
the relationship between concepts. 
The current findings are compatible with models of semantic cognition emphasizing 
conceptual flexibility (e.g., Kiefer & Pulvermuller, 2012), and broader dynamic views of 
cognition (e.g., Elman, 2004; Tabor, Juliano, & Tanenhaus, 1997). Our findings shed light on 
the dynamics of interaction between short-term contextual constrains (i.e. what’s often 
termed episodic knowledge) and long-term conceptual knowledge (i.e. semantic memory), 
suggesting that the notion of “semantic space” should not be interpreted as applying to a 
single memory system (e.g. semantic memory as distinct from other memory systems) but 
should be interpreted as a space defined across memory systems and the neural substrates 
that support them. Such interactions are one of the key issues in semantic cognition (Clarke 
& Tyler, 2015). What we have demonstrated here is that one crucial consequence of this 
interaction is an immediate change in the relationship between concepts, such that when 
seeing a removal man lifting a piano, we do indeed think of pianos as much more similar to 
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Appendix A  






Visual target Semantically and 
contextually related word 
Semantically but not 
contextually related word 
Unrelated word 
cat porcupine buffalo broccoli 
chicken pigeon ostrich hatchet 
dog squirrel ox blouse 
guppy terrapin dolphin saxophone 
canary robin stork tent 
ant caterpillar butterfly typewriter 
car bike train squid 
fox raccoon bison cheese 
fork scissors rake camel 
gloves scarf boots flute 
horse cow elephant jacket 
knife gun rifle eagle 
mixer toaster dishwasher cathedral 
motorcycle skateboard lorry biscuit 
olive walnut aubergine pillow 
pickle grape apple door 
rabbit hamster pony anchor 
raspberry peas pumpkin yacht 
shirt sweater coat goose 
snake worm crocodile hammer 
trumpet violin piano envelope 
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